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SCOTLAND: 
BACK INTO THE CLOSET? 
THE EDITORS 
The Scottish Government Year book 1980 is the fourth in 
our series. Since we published the 1979 Year book Scottish 
politics and government have undergone much change. All our 
previous Year books were written when there was a prospect that 
a directly elected Assembly would sit in Edinburgh to control 
the Scottish Office. This prospect was the central political 
concern of Scottish government during the recent Parliament 
(1974-79) and this centrality was reflected in our volumes. This 
hope or spectre has now passed. The Scottish people did not 
vote for the Government's plans, embodied in the Scotland Act, 
in sufficiently large numbers on 1 March 1979 for the Act to 
be implemented. Further, in the subsequent General Election the 
British people returned to power the only party, the Conservative 
Party, which had campaigned for a "No" vote in the referen-
dum. For these reasons devolution will not dominate the recently 
elected Parliament, nor will we have an elected forum for the 
discussion of Scottish politics for the next four or five years. 
However, there has been more to the change in Scottish politics 
than that. 
The recent General Election saw a government elected in 
Westminster which lacked a majority in Scotland. More to 
the point, the Conservative Party had a safe majority in Parlia-
ment but only twenty-two of the seventy-one Scottish parlia-
mentary seats. This means that the team of Scottish Office 
Ministers will have a weaker hand to play in the centre of power 
than their Labour predecessors. They will be taken less seriously 
in Whitehall and will find it more difficult to get Westminster's 
decisions taken seriously in Scotland. It is no criticism of the 
present Scottish Office team led by Mr George Younger to say 
that they will have much less leverage than did Mr Bruce Millan 
and his colleagues. 
It was frequently said during the 1974-79 Parliament that 
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Scotland and Wales were taken seriously because Labour and 
Conservative leaders had been shaken by the rise of the 
Nationalist parties. This was a half truth. Certainly they were 
taken seriously for this reason, but both also benefited from 
the double fact that they had elected a majority of MPs to the 
Government party and that that party had only a small majority 
- later a minority - in the House of Commons. Scotland's 
success in demanding increasingly favourable treatment from the 
centre depended on the parliamentary weakness of a government 
beholden to Scotland. Had the General Election of February 
1974 led to a large overall Labour majority it is safe to assume 
that nothing would have been done about devolution or about 
Scotland - for example, the Scottish Development Agency 
might well not have been created. Had the Labour Government 
elected in October 1974 with a bare majority won a large 
majority, the Government might well have treated its commit-
ment to devolution as it treated its commitments to open 
government and a wealth tax. Because the present Government 
is secure in its parliamentary position and not particularly 
beholden to Scotland, it need do little for Scotland and Scot-
land is unlikely to figure prominently in British politics for 
the next few years. 
This is a bleak prospect. It is not simply bleak in the sense 
that the future does not offer us great hope of advance. It is 
bleak in that the larger issues of Scottish politics may not be 
much discussed; and the major decisions affecting Scotland will 
be taken, once again, in private and in secret. 
I 
This year we publish three papers on the referendum. 
The first, by Ray Perman, analyses the campaign itself. The 
second, by Michael Brown, analyses the effects of the Press 
on that campaign. Perman points to the divisions within the 
"Yes" side as one reason for the victory of the "Nos". Divided, 
the "Yes" side certainly was. Devolution had become not just 
a political issue but a party issue and the "Yes" and "No" 
men of each party wanted to run their own show and not share 
credit or platforms with members of other parties. This had a 
more damaging effect on the "Yes" campaign than on the "No". 
The "Nos" appeared separately to say much the same things: 
the "Yes" had different messages. The Nationalist "Yes" people 
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made the Scottish argument: devolution was important for Scot-
tish self-respect and as a step to Scottish self-rule. The Labour 
(and Conservative) "Yes" people needed to di~tance themselves 
from this argument. For them the point was that devolution 
would lead to democratic control of the Scottish Office and, 
by making the government of Scotland more responsive to its 
people, guarantee the unity of the United Kingdom. The 
incompatibility of these two arguments hurt just because the 
Nationalists succeeded in getting their point across - and hence 
raised the fears of the anti-separatist majority - while the 
Labour democratic argument seems never to have penetrated 
at all. Many voters must have thought that only the SNP were 
in favour of the Government's Act. Michael Brown's careful 
analysis of the Press shows just why the "Yeses" were foolish 
to conduct so many campaigns: the Press was not going to 
give them enough space to develop these relatively sophisticated 
differences. Furthermore, he points to the fact that the "Nos" 
managed to dictate the issues on which the referendum campaign 
was fought, thus quite possibly neutralising the pro-devolution 
stance of the majority of the Scottish Press. 
In our third paper on the referendum, Chris Baur argues 
that this form of popular consultation is in danger of being 
discredited. Indeed the various ad hoc arrangements came close 
to bringing the whole electoral process (and not least the 
electoral register) into di~repute. Is there any other advanced 
industrial state which would invoke such an untried and ill-
considered device to adjudicate on an important constitutional 
issue? If the devolution referendum leads to a reconsideration 
of the electoral system and the role of referenda in British 
politics it will at least have accomplished some positi,ve good. 
The loss of face the Government suffered when the results 
were announced (particularly in Wales) led to the May 1979 
General Election. Without the prospect of devolution the 
Government lost the support of the Nationalists of both Scotland 
and Wales. It did not take long for the Conservatives to put 
together the coalition of anti-Government House of Commons 
votes which brought the Government down. We are pleased 
to publish here, for the first time, an account of the crucial 
meeting within the SNP parliamentary group which led to their 
decision to put down a motion of no confidence in the Govern-
ment. The divisions within the parliamentary group which James 
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Naughtie reveals in his piece are all too credible: few parties 
are the monoliths they like to appear in public. But these divisions 
within the SNP confirm the ineffective impression that party 
gave throughout the 1974-79 Parliament. 
In Scotland at the subsequent General Election, as Peter 
Hetherington points out, Labour won the battle. It had all 
the ammunition and the larger army. Thanks to its devolution 
stand it could no longer be labelled anti-Scottish, and thanks 
to the plans of the Conservatives it looked the better bet for 
the people of the depressed parts of central Scotland. Labour's 
problems will come in the longer term: will it be able to promise 
devolution at a future General Election, having failed to carry 
it through this time? Hetherington also points to the weakness 
of the SNP campaign: this was quite a surprise after its success 
in 1974. When the going got rough, the party faltered. 
In many ways the biggest talking point of 1978-79 was 
decline of the SNP. This can be overstated. Although its 17.3% 
of the poll in the General Election was quite a comedown after 
the 30% of October 1974, it is not a bad result on which to 
build. The fact that the SNP was reduced to two seats is as 
much a reflection of our electoral system as of its performance. 
But these comments cannot hide the fact that the SNP failed 
to live up to its boundless promise of 1974 and is now a much-
reduced party. However, the electoral failure of the party had 
given its left wing the spur to open a campaign to move the 
party away from its present right-wing bias. This struggle for 
the soul of the party may have significant long-term consequences 
for the future not only of the SNP, but also of Scottish politics 
in general. The Labour Party has never seriously been challenged 
for the votes of the working class. If it were to be challenged, 
all sorts of interesting vistas would open up. But for the time 
being the Left within the SNP remains very much a minority. 
II 
Perhaps the most significant long-term effect of the year's 
political events will be a change in the focus of political debate 
in Scotland. Because the recently elected Government has a 
secure majority and because it has little stake in Scotland, 
Scottish politics will be much less newsworthy than during the 
last Parliament. The important battles will be fought out in 
private. This change of emphasis poses a challenge for the 
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Yearbook. We began by wanting to illuminate the workings of 
Scottish administration and government; to bring light on the 
dark quarters. Now such light will be needed more than ever. 
Our suspicion is that one of the most important arenas of 
Scottish politics over the next few years will be the Rate Support 
Grant negotiations. The present Government was elected on a 
promise to reduce public spending. It never hid its intent. But 
neither this Government nor its Labour predecessor (which also 
cut public spending, after being forced to by the IMF) has 
been willing to face the full consequences of its decision. Govern-
ments are inescapably tempted to make the local authorities 
take the blame for government decisions and make some of the 
hardest choices. This problem arises because local government 
employs large numbers of people in public services, many of 
whom, such as teachers, environmental health inspectors and 
firemen, are required by statute. Many of the salary and other 
costs of these public employees are paid for by the central 
government. Each year central government negotiates with local 
government over the level of central support for local services: 
these negotiations are the Rate Support Grant (RSG) negotia-
tions. If central government brings down its Rate Support Grant, 
as this one has announced that it intends to do, local government 
is faced with the choice of cutting services and staff or raising 
rates - and probably will do a bit of both. 
We have a Conservative government. The body with which 
it will negotiate the RSG is the Labour-dominated Convention 
of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA). Scotland, unlike Eng-
land, and unlike Scotland before the recent reform of local 
government, has just one body to negotiate with central govern-
ment. Yet despite the fundamental importance of the issues 
to be decided, these negotiations will be conducted in private 
and will receive little Press coverage (though the losing side 
may leak the contents to the Press). If governments were 
less obsessed with secrecy, more could be known and public 
support for government might be encouraged. As it is, cynicism 
will grow. 
Too little is known about the working of government in 
Scotland. Chris Allen in his trenchant analysis of the available 
literature makes the all too pertinent point that studies of 
administration tend to substitute details for analysis. Allen's own 
analysis of the failure of Scottish political science can hardly 
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be accused of that - for all that this Year book has been 
consistently, and is again this year, aided by his lengthy biblio-
graphies. We are, however, delighted to offer a paper this year 
by Colin Wiseman which goes some way to filling one of the 
most annoying gaps: lack of analytical studies about the Scottish 
Office. Wiseman's paper, "Policy Making of the Scottish Health 
Services at National Level", is, as far as we know, the first 
paper to analyse policy-making in the Scottish Office on the 
basis of first-hand observation. 
Wiseman's picture of the Scottish Home and Health Depart-
ment operations is not entirely flattering. His main concern is 
that long-term policy-making in the department hardly exists: 
too much time is consumed by responding to emergencies as they 
arise. The department is a GP to an elderly, much scared patient. 
Wiseman would have it perform a more considered, more 
rational, less harassed role. There are, of course, many objec-
tions to Wiseman's view. Perhaps the most fundamental is that 
one cannot plan when one doesn't know what one is planning 
for. Since our culture lacks a generally agreed definition of 
health it is hardly fair to blame Civil Servants for failing to 
make us healthy. The other main objection is constitutional. 
Wiseman wants greater public control of and accountability by 
the Health Service in Scotland. His chart (fig. 1) gives away 
the present game: in it the Secretary of State and the Ministers 
are shown to be but one pressure group amongst many. Wise-
man's chart is, we do not doubt, accurate: it is also shameful 
in a country that purports to be a democracy. 
Wiseman's paper about policy-making in the SHHD differs 
in intent and compass from Mary Macdonald's paper about the 
Scottish Office in the last twenty-five years. In 1957, as part 
of the new Whitehall series on British Ministries, George Allen 
& Unwin published a description of the Scottish Office by Sir 
David Milne. Sir David was, at the time, the Permanent Under-
Secretary of State (i.e. the chief Civil Servant) in the Scottish 
Office. Despite its age and the considerable changes which have 
occurred in the operation of the Scottish Office since 1957, 
Sir David's is still the standard work on the subject. During 
1978, when it looked as if the devolution legislation would be 
implemented, the Scottish Office approached us with the offer 
of a paper from the inside which would update Sir David's 
book on the eve of the Office's anticipated transformation. We 
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agreed to publish such a piece and the Scottish Office put Mary 
Macdonald (a retired Assistant Secretary from the Scottish 
Office) and a research assistant, Adam Redpath, onto writing 
it for us. We publish their paper here. We think its account 
of the changes made will provide a useful baseline for future 
studies of the Scottish Office during this period of rapid change. 
Any analysis of the change must begin with an accurate picture 
of what has been done. 
With the record straight it is possible to see where future 
research ought to begin. We need to know more about the 
relations between the Scottish Office and the Whitehall Minis-
tries. Outsiders commonly assert that the Scottish Office lamely 
follows the lead given in England. On detailed technical matters 
this assertion may be difficult to contradict, but on more general 
policy lines this outsiders' perception is hotly contested from 
within the Scottish Office and by Miss Macdonald in her paper. 
We need studies of certain policies to see how this relationship 
works. We also need to know more about the internal workings 
of the Scottish Office, particularly about the question of the 
co-ordination of the several departments of the Scottish Office. 
The degree of departmental pride of people in the SDD, for 
instance, leads one to suspect that co-operation is not what 
it seems - and Wiseman's paper lends some support to this 
suspicion. We need to know more about it. There are questions 
about the relationship between the Scottish Office and the large 
number of QUANGOs which operate under its auspices. The 
accountability of these QUANGOs, as well as the degree and 
manner of Scottish Office influence and control of them, is a 
neglected field. Raymond Williams has recently written a most 
useful critical piece about the operations of the Arts Council, of 
which he is a member (Political Quarterly, Spring 1979). We need 
something similar for Scottish bodies. 
It is no secret that the relationships between the Scottish 
Office and the local authorities are not always smooth - but 
why not, and can anything be done about it? In her paper Miss 
Macdonald shows that the Scottish Office has divested itself of 
many small executive responsibilities - such as running farms 
- in recent years. One can't help wondering what happens to 
the Civil Servants who used to perform these tasks or to supervise 
those who performed them. Can they be fitted into the quite 
different work of the rest of this large government department 
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or not? There is also the related question of precise Scottish 
Office control of local government. Miss Macdonald points out 
that the departments have been divesting themselves of these 
controls too. This is certainly commendable, but is it not then 
a bit odd that the Scottish Office continues to employ so many 
professional Civil Servants, such as Inspectors of schools (we 
have as many as England and Wales together), architects and 
nurses? What do these professional staff do if they do not advise 
on very precise detailed execution of policy? 
We are likely to have a new parliamentary Select Committee 
to shadow the Scottish Office. Surely someone will investigate 
the work of this committee and compare it with some of the 
other parliamentary Select Committees? How much difference 
does the personality and the political weight carried by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland make? We harbour the sus-
picion that life is easier for Labour Secretaries of State because 
their party owes more to Scotland. But is it this sort of 
calculation of the weight of the administrative machine which 
wins arguments in Whitehall? We are asked by the Scottish 
Office to believe that it has a closer understanding of our needs 
and resources than the English Ministries have of their clients. 
Is this true? 
In suggesting that these questions remain to be answered 
we are not simply blaming the Scottish Office. The point made 
by Chris Allen about the feebleness and patchiness of academic 
work is relevant here. Our impression is that the Scottish Office 
is actually rather good, and certainly much better than it 
used to be, at providing access (to people like Mr Wiseman, for 
example) though it is still very touchy about what gets published. 
We must not, however, become obsessed with investigating 
the workings of the machine. It is the product which matters 
most of all, and this year we continue our series about the social 
and economic policies of government in Scotland with three 
papers on specific areas of policy-making. The first is a proposal 
by Mike Adler and Edward Woznick for an entirely new way 
of settling debt. This is a serious human and social problem 
in Scotland. A good proportion of our prisoners are in jail for 
the failure to pay debt. Other features of the debt collection 
system are also most unsatisfactory and humiliating to the people 
involved. Adler and Woznick call the present judicial basis of 
the system into question given that the facts of the case -
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how much is owed, and whether the debt is admitted - are 
rarely in question. They propose a new system for Scotland 
which, if adopted, would put us ahead of other countries in 
this area where we now lag. 
John Godfrey and Norman Godman contribute a paper 
to this year's Year book which makes proposals in another area 
of government policy: the Scottish fishing industry. Their pro-
posal for a Common Fisheries Policy is the first we have pub-
lished which puts Scottish policy into a European context. But 
as Godfrey and Godman show, it no longer makes sense for 
any one nation to try to have its own fishing policy. International 
co-operation is needed if we are to retain a fishing industry and 
the fish on which it is dependent. 
G. A. Mackay contributes the third paper on public policy 
- in this case energy policy. This is a matter not directly for 
government but for a number of QUANGOs - the electricity 
supply boards, the National Coal and Gas Boards and the 
nuclear power industry. Mackay notes that an increased emphasis 
on indigenous fuels, particularly coal with its high use of skilled 
manual labour, is desirable on social grounds. He also argues 
that the increasingly public debate about energy needs and energy 
usage which has marked Scottish discussion over the past few 
years is an encouraging sign which has led to slower but better 
policy decisions. Once again the danger of secret and private 
policy-making is emphasised. 
This danger and the prospect that Scottish politics and 
Scottish public life might go back into the closet from which 
it emerged in the late sixties is the biggest threat posed to us. 
Our first Year book was subtitled, in a paraphrase of the Govern-
ment's then infamous devolution White Paper: "Our Changing 
Scotland". If Scotland goes back into the closet we might title 
next year's book "Our Unchanging Scotland". But there are 
already some signs that we will not have to do this. The pessi-
mists have been heard too often lately. Despite the failure of 
the devolution legislation, public life in Scotland changed during 
the 1974-79 Parliament in ways which will bring about further 
changes. The most important administrative change was the 
creation of the Scottish Development Agency (SDA) and with 
it the admission by British government that Scotland's economy 
could not be wholly run from London. The long-term implica-
tions of this admission and the large sums of government money 
B 
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now being used to back it up are considerable. Moreover, the 
creation of a highly viable government agency in Scotland will 
only serve to increase the demand for some form of directly 
elected Scottish body to scrutinise the Scottish Office. 
At the same time, and notwithstanding the pain of the 
process, the politics of Scotland have changed considerably in 
the last five years. The Labour Party has now recovered its 
commitment to elective devolution and in some respects looks 
no less nationalist than the SNP. This reconversion by the party 
which holds the majority of Scottish seats and governs most 
major Scottish towns is more important than is often realised. 
The traumas of conception and rebirth belie the health of the 
bairn, and her importance. Three of the four political parties 
in Scotland which hold seats in Westminster are committed to 
devolution. Together these parties won 68% of Scottish votes 
at the 1979 Election and they hold forty- nine of Scotland's 
seventy-one parliamentary seats. 
Again, during the course of the recent Parliament there 
was a steady stream of government agencies which felt compelled 
to open up Scottish branches or create semi-autonomous Scottish 
regions. A recent example of such devolution of administrative 
power was the creation of the Scottish Council of the Council 
of National Academic Awards (CNAA). This devolution is a 
small step but it is a sign of the way things are moving. 
Finally, there was the devolution legislation and referendum. 
For all that the "No" side won the day on March 1, they did 
not win all of the arguments. The democratic accountability 
argument put by some in the "Yes" camp - which would have 
been so much more effective had John Mackintosh lived -
was never countered by the "Nos". Even the No-dominated 
Conservative Government will want to do something about this. 
If they don't, they make it easier for their enemies to do some-
thing really radical next time the wheel turns and the Conserva-
tives are out of power. 
